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THE MISAPPLICATION OF LEUNG KWOK HUNG IN
HONG KONG: AUTHORIZING THE RATIONALITY
REQUIREMENT FOR TEXTUALLY ABSOLUTE RIGHTS
Albert Connor Buchman†
Abstract: The Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (BORO) guarantees many
fundamental rights to Hong Kong’s permanent residents. In these constitutionally
significant statutes, two types of rights exist: 1) textually qualified rights, which contain
qualifying language indicating for what purposes a legislated restriction is permissible,
such as when necessary for national security, public order, public health or morals, and 2)
textually absolute rights, which contain no language indicating when a legislated
restriction on that right is permissible. In Leung Kwok Hung & Others v. HKSAR, the
Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal formulated a rationality requirement for when
restrictions are constitutionally valid. The Court held that the rationality requirement is
derived from the word “necessary” in qualifying language in the BORO Article
considered by the Court. First, this comment argues that subsequent courts have
misapplied Leung Kwok Hung’s formulation of the rationality requirement when
considering textually absolute BORO rights that do not contain the word “necessary.”
Second, this comment analyzes two possible approaches to correcting this misapplication
by constitutionally authorizing the rationality requirement for textually absolute rights in
a manner not reliant on the word “necessary.” This comment ultimately argues that the
second approach, implying the rationality requirement into the BORO, should be
followed.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2002, political activist Leung Kwok Hung and his assistants led
between forty and ninety-six people down Hong Kong’s Queensway, a
public highway.1 Arriving at the Hong Kong Police Headquarters, the
peaceful assembly protested the conviction of an activist for the assault and
obstruction of a police officer.2 The assembly leaders had previously refused
to follow a statutory notification procedure that allows the Police
Commissioner discretion to object to peaceful processions on the grounds of
public order.3 Police arrested the assembly leaders who were later convicted
of holding an unauthorized assembly in violation of this statute.4 They
ultimately appealed to Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal,5 arguing that the
† The author would like to thank Professor Theodore Myhre and the editorial staff of the Pacific
Rim Law & Policy Journal, especially Dr. George Radics, Lindsey Grieve, and Megan Winder.
1
Leung Kwok Hung & Others v. HKSAR, [2005] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 164, 176 (C.F.A.).
2
Id. at 176-77.
3
Public Order Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 245, § 13A. (H.K.).
4
Id.
5
For an account of Leung Kwok Hung’s and the assembly’s case through the various levels of
Hong Kong’s courts, see Janice Brabyn, Leung Kwok Hung and Others through the Hong Kong Courts, 36
HONG KONG L. J. 83 (2006).
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statutory notification procedure unconstitutionally infringed on their
fundamental right to peaceful assembly guaranteed by Article 17 of the
Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (“BORO”).6 In its final decision,
Leung Kwok Hung & Others v. HKSAR, the Court formulated the basis for
the rationality requirement.7 This requirement requires that restrictions on
BORO rights “be rationally connected with one or more of the legitimate
purposes [of the restriction].”8 According to the Court’s formulation, the
requirement is derived from the word “necessary” in BORO articles that
contain the word.9
Subsequent Hong Kong courts, however, have
misapplied this formulation when determining the constitutionality of
restrictions on BORO rights that do not contain the word “necessary.”10
The BORO incorporates fundamental rights found in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)11 into Hong Kong’s
domestic law.12 Although enacted as ordinary legislation,13 the BORO gains
constitutional significance through Article 39 of Hong Kong’s constitution,
the Basic Law,14 mandating that the ICCPR is to be applied to the region.15
Part II of the BORO states most fundamental rights in textually absolute
form, meaning that BORO articles provide no qualifying language indicating
when that right may be restricted.16 For example, the right to freedom of
opinion contained in Article 16 of the BORO simply states: “[e]veryone
shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.”17 In contrast to
textually absolute form, five BORO articles state rights in textually qualified
6
Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, (1991) Cap. 383, Part II, art. 17. (H.K.) [hereinafter BORO];
see Leung Kwok Hung, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 177-79.
7
See Leung Kwok Hung, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 184.
8
Id.
9
See id.; see infra Part III.A. This comment refers to rights provided by articles containing the
word “necessary” as “textually qualified rights.” See infra note 15.
10
See infra Part II.B. This comment refers to rights contained in articles not containing the word
“necessary” as “textually absolute rights.” See infra note 15.
11
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, Supp.
No. 16 at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
12
See XIANGGANG JI BEN FA, art. 39 (1990) (H.K.), available at http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/
en/basiclawtext/images/Basic_Law.pdf. [hereinafter BASIC LAW]. Furthermore, provisions of the BORO
mandate that any legislation enacted in Hong Kong cannot be inconsistent with rights supplied by the
BORO. See BORO, supra note 6, Part I, §§ 3, 4.
13
See Simon N. M. Young, Restricting Basic Rights in Hong Kong, 34 HONG KONG L. J. 109, 115
(2004).
14
See id. at 115-16.
15
See BASIC LAW, supra note 12.
16
See YASH GHAI. HONG KONG’S NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: THE RESUMPTION OF CHINESE
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE BASIC LAW 443-44 (2d ed. 1999) (noting that BORO rights are formulated in
“absolute” or “qualified” terms). The author has developed the terms “textually qualified” and “textually
absolute” in this comment for ease of reference. The term “textually” is used to maintain the distinction
rights may be formulated in their BORO text in absolute or qualified terms.
17
BORO, supra note 6, art. 16(1).
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form, meaning that the articles provide language indicating on what grounds
that right may be restricted.18 For example, Article 8, providing the right of
liberty of movement, allows restrictions when “necessary to protect national
security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and
freedoms of others.” 19
Hong Kong courts have consistently upheld restrictions imposed by
Hong Kong’s local legislature, the Legislative Council, on both textually
absolute and textually qualified BORO rights.20 Generally, in doing so,
courts require that any restriction on a BORO right be rationally connected
with the pursuit of one or more legitimate societal aims (“rationality
requirement”). 21 The Court of Final Appeal set out the standard formulation
for the rationality requirement in Leung Kwok Hung. In this case, the Court
considered the textually qualified right of peaceful assembly contained in
Article 17 of the BORO. The text of this right states that restrictions are
allowed when “imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary
in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety,
public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”22 Interpreting this Article,
the Court asserted that the rationality requirement is derived from the word
“necessary.”23
Subsequently, courts have cited Leung Kwok Hung as primary
authority for the rationality requirement when considering the
constitutionality of restrictions on both textually absolute and textually
qualified fundamental rights.24 However, these courts have misapplied the
Leung Kwok Hung formulation by utilizing the rationality requirement for
textually absolute rights that do not contain the word “necessary.”25
This comment argues that Hong Kong courts have misapplied the
Leung Kwok Hung’s rationality requirement formulation to textually
absolute BORO rights. Furthermore, this comment argues that courts should
18

See generally BORO, supra note 6. Article 8 guarantees the right of liberty of movement, Article
16 guarantees the right of freedom of opinion and expression, Article 17 guarantees the right of freedom of
peaceful assembly, and Article 18 guarantees freedom of association.
19
BORO, supra note 6, art. 8. There are variations of this language in the five articles. See infra
Part II.B. for a complete description.
20
See infra Part III.
21
See Leung Kwok Hung, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 184. In addition to the rationality requirement, any
restriction on a BORO right must also be 1) prescribed by law and 2) the means employed to restrict the
fundamental right must be no more than is necessary to achieve that legitimate aim (“proportionality
requirement”). Id. at 179, 184.
22
BORO, supra note 6, art. 17 (emphasis added).
23
Leung Kwok Hung, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 184.
24
See infra Part III.
25
See infra Part III.B.
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imply the requirement into the BORO to correct this misapplication. Part II
reviews Hong Kong’s legal system, the legal sources of fundamental rights,
and the difference between textually absolute and textually qualified BORO
rights. Part III discusses Leung Kwok Hung and highlights how Hong Kong
courts have misapplied its formulation of the rationality requirement. Part
IV analyzes two possible approaches for correcting this misapplication by
authorizing the rationality requirement without reliance on the word
“necessary” in BORO text: 1) rooting the requirement in Article 39 of the
Basic Law or 2) implying the requirement into the BORO. Additionally,
Part IV argues that courts should adopt the latter approach because it bears
little risk of being overturned.
II.

BACKGROUND

Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region (“SAR”)26 of the
People’s Republic of China (“PRC”). The PRC exercises sovereignty over
the region but leaves Hong Kong to exercise a high degree of autonomy,
including management of its legal system.27 After transfer to the PRC in
1997, Hong Kong retained the common law legal system left by its previous
sovereign, the United Kingdom.28 In this system, many fundamental rights
are derived out of the constitutionally significant BORO, which enacts the
ICCPR.29 The BORO provides two types of rights: 1) textually qualified
rights that contain language indicating when the right can be restricted and
2) textually absolute rights that do not indicate when the right can be
restricted.30
This part of the comment provides an overview of the structure of
fundamental rights in Hong Kong’s legal system. First, Section A describes
Hong Kong’s transfer in sovereignty and current legal system. Section B
describes how fundamental rights are derived out of BORO, highlighting the
difference between textually absolute and textually qualified BORO rights.

26

See XIAN FA, art. 31 (1982) (P.R.C.); see also BASIC LAW, supra note 12, arts. 2, 4.
Judith R. Krebs, Comment, One Country, Three Systems? Judicial Review in Macau After Ng
King Ling, 10 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 111 (2000); see Basic Law, supra note 12, arts. 4, 8; see infra Part
II.A.
28
See infra Part II.A.
29
See infra Part II.B.
30
See infra Part II.B.
27
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Hong Kong’s Common Law Legal System Was Established by the
United Kingdom and Has Survived After the Region’s Transfer to the
PRC

Prior to the establishment of the PRC’s sovereignty in 1997, Hong
Kong was a British colony.31 During this time, the United Kingdom
established a common law legal system with a complex hierarchy of courts
and tribunals.32 The Privy Council in London held jurisdiction as the final
court of appeal for the colony.33 The courts applied British law to all people
living in the colony, adapting it to local conditions.34 Importantly, the legal
system in Hong Kong acquired the British common law principles of
equality of all parties before the law,35 judicial review over executive and
legislative acts,36 the “rule of law,”37 and an independent judiciary.38
In 1984, the PRC and Britain signed the Sino-British Joint
Declaration of 1984, creating the mechanism for future transfer of
sovereignty between the two States and defining the relationship Hong Kong
would enjoy under Chinese sovereignty.39 Subsequently, a committee
appointed by the PRC’s legislative body, the National People’s Congress,40
drafted the Basic Law, codifying the relationship between Hong Kong and
the PRC after transfer.41 In 1997, the United Kingdom formally transferred
sovereignty and physical possession of the region to the PRC, and Hong
Kong became a SAR under Article 31 of the PRC’s Constitution.42 Pursuant
to Article 11 of the Basic Law, the Basic Law itself became Hong Kong’s
constitutional authority because “[n]o law of the legislature . . . may
contravene this law.”43 The Basic Law continues to govern the relationship
between the PRC and Hong Kong.44

31

YASH GHAI, supra note 16, at 1.
Id. at 24.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 23.
35
Id. at 266-68; BASIC LAW, supra note 12, art. 25; BORO, supra note 6, art. 22.
36
YASH GHAI, supra note 16, at 266-68.
37
Steve Tsang, Commitment of the Rule of Law and Judicial Independence, in JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN HONG KONG 1 (Steve Tsang ed., 2001).
38
Id.; see, e.g, BASIC LAW, supra note 12, arts. 2, 19.
39
Albert H.Y. Chen, Constitutional Adjudication in Post-1997 Hong Kong, 15 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y
J. 627, 628 (2006).
40
See YASH GHAI, supra note 16, at 101-02.
41
Id. at 35; Byron S.J. Weng, Judicial Independence Under the Basic Law, in JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN HONG KONG 48 (Steve Tsang ed., 2001).
42
See XIAN FA, art. 31 (1982) (P.R.C.).
43
BASIC LAW, supra note 12, art. 11. There is considerable controversy on whether the Basic Law is
truly a constitution, a “mini-constitution,” or an ordinary statute. See YASH GHAI, supra note 16, at 137;
32
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Through the Basic Law, the National People’s Congress authorizes
Hong Kong to exercise a “high degree of autonomy.”45 For example, the
region is authorized to use its own regional flag;46 use a capitalist economic
system for 50 years after transfer;47 and use English as an official language.48
Chapter IV, Section 4 of the Basic Law specifically authorizes Hong Kong to
operate its own legal system,49 and Article 80 authorizes Hong Kong to
establish courts.50 Article 81 lays out the basic structure of Hong Kong’s
judiciary. The Court of Final Appeal is the highest appellate court, and the
Court of Appeal is the intermediate appellate court.51 At the trial level are
the Court of First Instance, district courts, magistrates’ courts, and
administrative courts.52
The Basic Law limits the courts’ power of interpretation of the Basic
Law.53 Article 158 vests all interpretation of the Basic Law in the PRC’s
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (“NPCSC”), a
permanent body of the PRC’s primary legislature.54 Under this Article, the
NPCSC can issue an interpretation of the Basic Law at any time, whether
during adjudication or not.55 Hong Kong courts are authorized with limited
ability to interpret the Basic Law.56 Pursuant to Article 158(2), courts can
interpret the Basic Law only during adjudication that involves subject matter
relating to regional autonomy.57 If the subject matter, however, concerns the
Weng, supra note 41, at 70 n.2. For purposes of this comment, the Basic Law will be considered Hong
Kong’s constitution.
44
See BASIC LAW, supra note 12, ch. II.
45
Id. art. 2.
46
Id. art. 10.
47
Id. art. 5.
48
Id. art. 9.
49
See id. ch. IV, § 4.
50
See BASIC LAW, supra note 12, art. 80.
51
See id. art. 81.
52
See id.
53
See id. art. 158; Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration, [1999] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 577 (C.F.A.);
INTERPRETATION BY THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS OF ARTICLES 22(4)
AND 24(2)(3) OF THE BASIC LAW OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION (adopted by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.), June 26, 1999, http://www.hklii.org/hk/legis/en/ord/2106/
longtitle.html (last visited May 22, 2010) [hereinafter NPCSC Interpretation].
54
XIAN FA, art. 57 (1982) (P.R.C.).
55
Director of Immigration v. Chong Fung Yuen, [2001] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 533, 545 (C.F.A.); see Ling
Bing, Subject Matter Limitation on the NPCSC's Power to Interpret the Basic Law, 37 HONG KONG L. J.
619, 623 (2007).
56
See BASIC LAW, supra note 12, art. 158(2).
57
Id. By way of this authorization, Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal has ultimate power to
review matters falling in the autonomy of the region, including the constitutionality of domestic laws that
infringe on fundamental BORO rights. See id. art. 82 (vesting final adjudication in the Court of Final
Appeal). Article 158(2) in conjunction with Articles 11, 81, 158(3) of the Basic Law give Hong Kong
courts limited powers of constitutional review over domestic matters. Richard Gordon, The Rise and Risks
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“affairs which are the responsibility of the Central People’s Government, or
[concerns] the relationship between the Central Authorities and the Region,”
courts must seek a final interpretation from the NPCSC.58
As sources of law, Hong Kong courts utilize the Basic Law, common
law, and regional ordinances enacted by the Legislative Council.59 Also, per
Annex III of the Basic Law, a number of national laws enacted by the PRC
apply in Hong Kong.60 However, national laws do not apply directly—
Article 18 requires the Legislative Council to enact them as regional
ordinances.61 In Hong Kong’s complex legal system, fundamental rights are
derived out of a number of legal sources. The next section highlights how
many of these rights are derived out of the BORO.62
B.

The BORO Provides ICCPR Rights to Hong Kong Residents, Stating
Those Rights in Textually Absolute or Textually Qualified Form

Fundamental rights are derived from the ICCPR as applied to Hong
Kong by the BORO.63 Article 39 of the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s
constitutional authority, mandates that the ICCPR be enacted into Hong
Kong law.64 The ICCPR is a multilateral treaty that requires party States65 to
provide for a range of substantive civil and political rights.66 The ICCPR
does not, however, provide enforceable legal rights among its parties.67
Rather, party states must implement the treaty into their domestic laws.68 In
1991, the United Kingdom enacted the BORO in Hong Kong, giving legal

of Constitutional Judicial Review in Hong Kong, HONG KONG LAWYER, Dec. 2009, http://www.hklawyer.com/InnerPages_features/0/1512/2009/12 (last visited Apr. 22, 2010); Weng, supra note 41, at 60.
58
YASH GHAI, supra note 16, at 103-05. The existence and utilization of Article 158 raises the
question of whether the Hong Kong judiciary is truly independent.
59
Id. at 279, 361-00. Also, some British legislation and common law survived transfer and is still
applied by Hong Kong courts.
60
See BASIC LAW, supra note 12, Annex III.
61
There are two exceptions to this rule. Article 14 and 18 of the Basic Law allow national laws
relating to the national military station in Hong Kong or laws of war and emergency to apply directly.
They do not require enactment by the Legislative Council to take force in the region. See BASIC LAW,
supra note 12, arts. 14, 18.
62
See infra Part II.B.
63
Chapter III of the Basic Law provides for a number of express fundamental rights that are not
dependent on the BORO for implementation in the region. Additionally, many fundamental rights are
expressly provided for in both the Basic Law and BORO. This comment limits its focus to restrictions on
rights derived out of the BORO and not the Basic Law.
64
See BASIC LAW, supra note 12, art. 39.
65
There are currently 165 parties to the ICCPR. See ICCPR, supra note 11, ch. IV, § 4
66
SCOTT N. CARLSON & GREGORY GRISVOLD, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 1-2 (2003).
67
Young, supra note 13, at 115.
68
Id.
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effect to ICCPR rights in the region.69 The BORO survived the transfer of
sovereignty when the Basic Law came into force and mandated that the
ICCPR continue to be applied in Hong Kong.70 Part II of the BORO
contains the ICCPR rights applied to Hong Kong.71
The BORO contains rights stated in either absolute terms or qualified
terms. In total, the BORO contains twenty-three Articles protecting
fundamental rights.72 Nineteen of these rights are stated in absolute terms,
with no language stating when and how the right can be restricted.73 This
comment refers to these rights as “textually absolute rights” for ease of
reference.74 In contrast, the remaining five articles are stated in qualified
terms, containing language that states when and for what purposes the right
may be restricted.75 For example, four76 of these articles use the language
that restrictions are only permissible when “necessary to protect national
security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals” or the “rights
and freedoms of others . . . .”77 The remaining article, Article 21, providing
the right to participate in public life, permits restrictions that are not
“unreasonable.”78 This comment refers to rights containing qualifying
language as “textually qualified rights” because they provide for permissible
qualifications on rights in their text.79 Confusingly, there is no general
scheme for limitations on rights provided in the BORO.80 It is unclear why
the drafters of both documents chose certain rights to have language
providing for limitations but did not for others.81 The next section describes
69
Johannes Chan & Yash Ghai, A Comparative Perspective on the Bill of Rights, in THE HONG
KONG BILL OF RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 1 (Yohannes Chan & Yash Ghai eds., 1993)
70
See Young, supra note 13, at 110; Chan & Ghai, supra note 69, at 1.
71
See BORO, supra note 6, Part II.
72
See id.
73
This comment refers to these rights as “textually absolute” rights.
74
See supra text accompanying note 16.
75
These articles are: Article 8 guaranteeing the right of liberty of movement, Article 16 guaranteeing
the right of freedom of opinion and expression, Article 17 guaranteeing the right of freedom of peaceful
assembly, and Article 18 guaranteeing freedom of association. The language in these articles matches the
ICCPR verbatim.
76
Article 5 provides the fifth right, liberty and security of persons, that contains limiting language.
This article states that “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived
of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law.”
77
Article 16(3)(a) has a slight variation on this language: “for respect of the rights or reputations of
others.” Many of the rights also require that the restriction be provided by law. Because Article 39 of the
Basic Law already requires restrictions to be prescribed by law, this language does not need to be examined
here.
78
This language was interpreted by the Court of First Instance in Chan Kin Sum v. Secretary for
Justice, [2009] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 166, 192-195 (C.F.I.). This language has not been examined by Hong Kong’s
appellate courts to date. Thus, this comment will not focus on this BORO right.
79
See supra text accompanying n.16.
80
YASH GHAI, supra note 16, at 424.
81
Id. (“it is hard to understand why [these rights] have been so singled out”).
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how courts have utilized a rationality requirement when considering the
validity of restrictions on both textually absolute and textually qualified
BORO rights.
III.

LEUNG KWOK HUNG FORMULATED THE RATIONALITY REQUIREMENT,
WHICH SUBSEQUENT COURTS HAVE MISAPPLIED

For restrictions on BORO rights to be constitutional, they must meet
the rationality requirement, mandating that restrictions be rationally
connected with the pursuit of one or more legitimate societal aims.82 In
2005, the Court of Final Appeal formulated the standard for the rationality
requirement in Leung Kwok Hung & Others v. HKSAR.83 In its decision, the
Court asserted that the rationality requirement is authorized by the word
“necessary” in the constitutional text of the textually qualified article before
the Court.84 Since then, all levels of courts have consistently applied the
Leung Kwok Hung formulation.85 Rather than limit Leung Kwok Hung to
textually qualified BORO rights, however, later courts have misapplied the
rationality requirement.86 These courts have cited Leung Kwok Hung when
applying the rationality requirement to restrictions on textually absolute
BORO rights where there is no language from which to derive the rationality
requirement.87
This part of the comment provides an overview of the Leung Kwok
Hung decision and its later application arguing that courts have misapplied
82

Leung Kwok Hung, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 184.
Id. The rationality requirement was first articulated by the Court of Appeal in R v. Sing Yau
Ming, [1991] H.K.L.Y. 134 (C.A.). With later cases, the Court of Appeal has implicitly rejected Sing Yau
Ming’s approach. See Hung Chan Wa & Another v. HKSAR, [2005] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 291, [81] (C.A.).
Furthermore, the relationship of the BORO with the Letters Patent, Hong Kong’s pre-1997 constitutionality
authority, is different than the relationship with the Basic Law. For these reasons, this comment focuses on
jurisprudence post-1997 Hong Kong. For an account of the requirements in pre-1997 Hong Kong, see
Yash Ghai, Sentinels of Liberty or Sheep in Woolf's Clothing? Judicial Politics and the Hong Kong Bill of
Rights, 60 MODERN L. REV. 459, 467-71 (1997), http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1097209.pdf (last
visited May 22, 2010).
84
Leung Kwok Hung, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 184.
85
To the author’s knowledge, courts have cited Leung Kwok Hung as precedent for the rationality
requirement in 10 cases. These include: HKSAR v. Ng Po On, [2008] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 176, 191-92 (C.F.A.),
Mo Yuk Ping v. HKSAR, [2007] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 750, 78 (C.F.A.); HKSAR v. Lam Kwong Wai, [2006] 3
H.K.L.R.D. 808, 825 (C.F.A.); Official Receiver & Trustee in Bankruptcy of Chan Wing Hing & Another
v. Chan Wing Hing & Another & Secretary for Justice (Intervener), [2006] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 687, 699
(C.F.A.); Chan Hei Ling Helen v. Medical Council of Hong Kong, [2009] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 174, 51 (C.A.);
Kwok Hay Kwong v. Medical Council of Hong Kong, [2008] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 524, 536 (C.A.); Chan Hau
Man Christina v. Commissioner of Police, [2009] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 797, 811 (C.F.I.); Wong Tze Yam v.
Commissioner of Police, [2009] 5 H.K.L.R.D. 836, 846-47 (C.F.I.); Chan Kin Sum, 2 H.K.L.R.D. at 194;
Democratic Party v. Secretary for Justice, [2007] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 804, 818-19 (C.F.I.).
86
See infra Part III.B.
87
See id.
83
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the rationality requirement to textually absolute rights. Section A discusses
the Court of Final Appeal’s decision in Leung Kwok Hung. Section B
highlights how courts have misapplied Leung Kwok Hung’s rationality
requirement formulation to textually absolute rights.
A.

In Leung Kwok Hung, the Court of Final Appeal Formulated the
Rationality Requirement, Deriving It from the Word Necessary in
BORO Text

In Leung Kwok Hung & Others v. HKSAR,88 the Court of Final
Appeal formulated the rationality requirement. In this case, assembly
leaders led a procession involving between forty and ninety-six people
without giving mandatory notice to the police pursuant to Section 13A of the
Public Order Ordinance.89 Section 13A requires that all assembly organizers
give written notice to the police of all processions involving more than thirty
people, with descriptions of the purpose, time, route, and estimated number
of people.90 Section 14(1) of the same ordinance gives the Commissioner of
Police discretion to object to the procession if the Commissioner reasonably
considers objection “necessary in the interests of national security or public
safety, or public order (ordre public) or the protection of the rights and
freedom of others.”91 A magistrate convicted the assembly leaders, and the
Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction. The assembly leaders appealed to
the Court of Final Appeal.92
At issue before the Court was whether Section 14(1) of the ordinance
violated the assembly leaders’ right to peaceful assembly under Article 17 of
the BORO, a textually qualified right. Article 17 states:
The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized. No
restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other
than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the

88

Leung Kwok Hung, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 164.
Public Order Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 245, § 13A. (H.K.); Leung Kwok Hung, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at
176. The Public Order Ordinance is “concerned with regulation of public assemblies.” HONG KONG
POLICE, GUIDELINES ON THE APPROACH TO THE PUBLIC ORDER ORDINANCE IN RELATION TO PUBLIC
MEETINGS AND PUBLIC PROCESSIONS 1 (2008), http://www.police.gov.hk/ppp_en/08_forms/doc/poop08.pdf
(last visited May 10, 2010).
90
Leung Kwok Hung, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 164.
91
Public Order Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 245, § 14(1). (H.K.)
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Leung Kwok Hung, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 177.
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protection of public health or morals or the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.
From its text, Article 17 provides both the right to peacefully assemble as
well as permissible grounds in which to restrict the right.
Turning to the question of the constitutionality of the restriction, the
Court stated that “the restriction must be necessary in a democratic society93
in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre
public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.”94 In this way, the Court asserted that the
rationality requirement was necessary for a restriction to be to be
constitutional.
From there, the Court formulated the rationality requirement from the
word “necessary.” First, the Court inferred a “proportionality test” from the
word “necessary” in the Article 17 text by asserting that “the constitutional
requirement of necessity involves the application of a proportionality test.”95
Second, the Court defined the proportionality test to include the rationality
requirement. Specifically, the Court asserted “the proportionality test should
be formulated in these terms . . . the restriction must be rationally connected
with one or more of the legitimate purposes . . . .”96 This statement
establishes the rationality requirement by requiring a rational connection
between a restriction on a BORO right and a legitimate state aim.97
Attempting to support its adoption of the rationality requirement, the
Court cited two cases.98 Unfortunately, the Court’s opinion did not explain
how these cases actually supported the adoption of the rationality
requirement.99 Furthermore, the opinion did not explain how these cases
93
Id. at 183. Although Hong Kong is not a democracy, the Court interpreted this text as following
the Siracusa Principles on the Limitations and Derogation Provisions in the ICCPR, where a group of
experts state that a society which recognizes the human rights set forth in the United Nationals Charter and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights may be viewed as meeting the definition of a democratic
society. The Court also noted that this interpretation is consistent with that of the European Court of
Human Rights.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 184 (emphasis added). The Court also defined the proportionality test as including a
“proportionality requirement,” requiring that “the means used to impair the right of peacefully assembly
must be no more than is necessary to accomplish the legitimate purpose in question.”
97
Id.
98
See Leung Kwok Hung, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 183 (citing HKSAR v. Ng Kung Siu & Another, [1999] 3
H.K.L.R.D. 907 (C.F.A.)) (holding that the aims of a flag desecration law were within permissible
restrictions provided by the BORO text); Ming Pao Newspapers Ltd. & Others v. A-G of Hong Kong,
[1996] 2 H.K.L.R. 239, 248 (P.C.) (appeal taken from H.K.) (pre-transfer Privy Council case citing British
precedent as authorizing the rationality requirement)).
99
See Leung Kwok Hung, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 183
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supported the formulation that the requirement is derived out of the word
“necessary.”100
Turning to the application of the newly established rationality
requirement formulation, the Court held that the Commissioner’s discretion
to restrict the assembly leaders’ right to peaceful assembly, authorized by
the ordinance in question, was within public order.101 In making this
holding, the Court reasoned that the restriction on peaceful assembly
satisfied the rationality requirement: “The discretion is of assistance in
enabling Government to fulfill its positive duty. It is a limited discretion,
constrained by the proportionality test.” 102
Overall, the Leung Kwok Hung Court formulated a basis for the
rationality requirement for textually qualified rights, such as the right of
peaceful assembly at issue before the Court. It held that the word
“necessary” in the BORO text involved the application of a proportionality
test, which includes the rationality requirement. The Court, however, did
not state or indicate whether this holding should extend to textually absolute
rights. Leung Kwok Hung is now the primary case authorizing the
rationality requirement for textually qualified rights—courts have cited
Leung Kwok Hung in all but one case considering textually qualified
rights.103
B.

Courts Have Misapplied the Leung Kwok Hung Formulation when
Considering Restrictions on Textually Absolute Rights

Several cases have cited Leung Kwok Hung as authority for the
rationality requirement when considering the constitutionality of restrictions
on the textually absolute BORO rights of the right to equality before the
law104 and the right to be presumed innocent.105 These rights do not contain
the word “necessary” or any other words in which to derive the rationality
requirement, as was formulated by Leung Kwok Hung.106 Thus, this
100

See id.
Id. at 197.
102
Again, this use of the term “proportionality test” includes the rationality requirement.
103
See, e.g., Chan Hei Ling Helen v. Medical Council of Hong Kong, 4 H.K.L.R.D. at 51; Chan Kin
Sum, 2 H.K.L.R.D. at 194; Chan Hau Man Christina, 4 H.K.L.R.D. at 811. The one case that did not cite
Leung Kwok Hung is Kong Yun Kim v. Director of Welfare, [2009] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 382 (C.F.I.). In this
case, the Court of First Instance merely applied the rationality requirement but did not cite any authority for
its use or explain how it was derived. See Kong Yun Kim, 4 H.K.L.R.D. at 415-17.
104
See Leung v. Secretary for Justice, [2006] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 211 (C.F.A).
105
See Lam Kwong Wai, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 825; Ng Po On, 4 H.K.L.R.D. at 191-92.
106
BORO rights provide for rights in the ICCPR, and ICCPR rights reflect the scheme of providing
textually absolute and textually qualified rights. YASH GHAI, supra note 16, at 424. Interestingly, Dr.
Nihal Jayawickrama has suggested that textually absolute rights in the ICCPR “may not be restricted on
101

JULY 2010

MISAPPLICATION OF LEUNG KWOK HUNG IN HONG KONG

577

comment argues that these cases have misapplied Leung Kwok Hung’s
rationality requirement formulation.
One court has misapplied the Leung Kwok Hung formulation when
considering the textually absolute right of equality before the law. In Leung
v. Secretary for Justice,107 the Court of Final Appeal considered a restriction
on Article 22 of the BORO.108 This textually absolute Article provides that
“[a]ll people are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law . . . .”109 There is no further
language expressly stating for what legitimate purposes a restriction is
authorized.110 Before the Court, a 20-year-old homosexual petitioner argued
that Section 118C of the Crimes Ordinance111 was contrary to his right to
equality before the law guaranteed by Article 22 of the BORO.112 Section
118c makes “homosexual buggery113 with or by [a] man under 21” an
offense.114 Specifically, the plaintiff argued that the law resulted in unequal
treatment because a 16-year-old heterosexual person could legally engage in
sexual intercourse, but a 16-year-old homosexual person could not engage in
buggery.115 In considering the constitutionality of Section 118C, the Court
cited Leung Kwok Hung as authorizing the rationality requirement.116 The
Court, however, did not discuss how the rationality requirement was derived
out of the textually absolute right BORO right.117 Applying the rationality
requirement, the Court held that the restriction was unconstitutional because
there was no rational justification for the restriction.118 Thus, overall, the
Court misapplied the Leung Kwok Hung formulation in this case because the
BORO article before the Court did not contain the word “necessary” in
which to derive the requirement.
Several courts have misapplied Leung Kwok Hung’s rationality
requirement formulation to the textually absolute right to be presumed
any grounds whatsoever.” See NIHAL JAYAWICKRAMA, THE JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW: NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 182-83 (2002). This raises the question
of whether Hong Kong courts should allow any restrictions on textually absolute BORO rights. This
question is beyond the scope of this comment.
107
Leung v. Secretary for Justice, [2006] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 211 (C.F.A).
108
See id. at 234-41.
109
BORO, supra note 6, art. 22.
110
See id.
111
Crimes Ordinance, (1991) Cap. 200, § 118C (H.K.).
112
See BORO, supra note 6, art. 22.
113
Buggery is defined as sodomy. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 207 (8th ed. 2004).
114
Crimes Ordinance, (1991) Cap. 200, § 118C (H.K.).
115
See Leung v. Secretary for Justice, 4 H.K.L.R.D. at 235.
116
Id.
117
See id.
118
See Leung v. Secretary for Justice, 4 H.K.L.R.D. at 239-40.
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innocent contained in Article 11(1) of the BORO.119 This Article provides
that “[e]veryone charged with a criminal offense shall have the right to be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.”120 There is no
language stating for what legitimate purposes a restriction is authorized.121
Because this article does not contain the word “necessary,” these courts have
misapplied the Leung Kwok Hung formulation. Two cases are illustrative.
The first case is HKSAR v. Lam Kwong Wai.122 The government,
respondents, charged petitioners with possessing imitation firearms, which
was prohibited by Section 20(3) of the Firearms and Ammunition
Ordinance.123 This statute provides that a person who is in possession of an
imitation firearm is presumed to have committed an offense, unless he or she
proves to the magistrate that he or she was not in possession of the imitation
firearm for a purpose dangerous to the public peace or of committing an
offense.124 Petitioners argued to the Court of Final Appeal that the
persuasive onus imposed by the Ordinance was contrary to their right to be
presumed innocent, which is guaranteed by Article 11(1) of the BORO.125
The Court cited Leung Kwok Hung as authority for applying the rationality
requirement for the textually absolute Article 22.126 The Court, however, did
not discuss how the rationality requirement was derived out of a BORO
article that did not contain the word “necessary.”127 Applying the rationality
requirement, the Court reasoned that Section 20(3) fulfilled the rationality
requirement because its legislative purpose was the “prevention, suppression
and punishment of serious crime,” especially since imitation firearms were
hard to distinguish from real firearms.128 Because Article 11(1) does not
contain the word “necessary” in which to derive the rationality requirement,
this Court misapplied the Leung Kwok Hung formulation.
The second illustrative case is HKSAR v. Hung Chan Wa &
Another.129 Before the Court of Final Appeal, respondents argued that
Section 47 of the Dangerous Drug Ordinance, under which they were

119

See Lam Kwong Wai, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 825; HKSAR v. Hung Chan Wa & Another, [2006] 3
H.K.L.R.D. at [75]; Ng Po On, 4 H.K.L.R.D. at 191-92.
120
BORO, supra note 6, art. 11(1).
121
See id.
122
Lam Kwong Wai, 3 H.K.L.R.D. 808
123
Id. at 817; Firearms and Ammunition Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 238, § 20(3). (H.K.).
124
See Firearms and Ammunition Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 238, § 20(3). (H.K.).
125
Lam Kwong Wai, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 815.
126
See id. at 825.
127
See id.
128
Id. at 826.
129
HKSAR v. Hung Chan Wa & Another, [2006] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 841 (C.F.A.).
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originally convicted,130 encroached on their right to be presumed innocent
pursuant to Article 11(1) of the BORO.131 Specifically, Section 47 provides
that “any person who is proved or presumed to have had a dangerous drug in
his possession shall, until the contrary is proved, be presumed to have
known the nature of such drug.”132 The Court did not expressly cite Leung
Kwok Hung as authority for the rationality requirement.133 Rather, the Court
implicitly cited Leung Kwok Hung by citing Lam Kwong Wai, a case that
directly cited Leung Kwok Hung.134 To emphasize its implicit adoption of
Leung Kwok Hung, the Court in Hung Chan Wa stated “[a]s this Court
discusses the relevant principles governing these matters in . . . Lam Kwong
Wai . . . there is no occasion to repeat what is said there.”135 Applying the
rationality requirement, the Court reasoned that the presumptions were
rationally connected with the legitimate objectives of preventing trade and
use of dangerous drugs, especially as prosecutors often had difficulty
proving possession.136 Again, because Article 11(1) does not contain the
word “necessary” in which to derive the rationality requirement, the Court
misapplied the Leung Kwok Hung formulation.
Overall, courts have applied Leung Kwok Hung’s formulation of the
rationality requirement to the textually absolute right to be equal before the
law and the right to be presumed innocent. Because Leung Kwok Hung
asserted that the rationality requirement is rooted in qualifying language in
the BORO text, these courts have misapplied the formulation, as textually
absolute rights do not contain any qualifying language.
IV.

COURTS SHOULD CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES FOR
AUTHORIZING THE RATIONALITY REQUIREMENT

Hong Kong courts’ extensive citation of Leung Kwok Hung suggests
that the case’s rationality requirement formulation is now entrenched as
authority for courts considering the constitutionality of restrictions on
BORO rights.137 As discussed infra, courts have misapplied the formulation
130
Respondents were originally convicted by a magistrate of possessing a container containing a
dangerous drug, but the Court of Appeal reversed. Hung Chan Wa, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at [37]. The
government, as petitioners, appealed to the Court of Final Appeal. Id.
131
Dangerous Drugs Ordinance, (1992) Cap. 134, § 47. (H.K.); see Hung Chan Wa, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at
[38].
132
Dangerous Drugs Ordinance, (1992) Cap. 134, § 47.
133
See Hung Chan Wa, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at [75].
134
Id. (citing Lam Kwong Wai, 3 H.K.L.R.D. 808).
135
Id. (citing Lam Kwong Wai, 3 H.K.L.R.D. 808). Lam Kwong Wai is discussed in Part III.B.
136
Id. at [76].
137
See supra text accompanying note 85.
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to textually absolute rights that do not contain qualifying language in which
to derive the rationality requirement according to Leung Kwok Hung’s
formulation.138 This part of the comment examines two possible approaches
for correcting courts’ misapplication of Leung Kwok Hung. Both approaches
would allow courts to authorize the rationality requirement for both textually
absolute and textually qualified BORO rights without reliance on the word
“necessary.” Section A examines the possible approach of rooting the
rationality requirement in Article 39 of the Basic Law. Section B examines
the possible approach of implying the rationality requirement into the
BORO. Furthermore, Section B argues that courts should follow the latter
approach of implying the rationality requirement into the BORO.
A.

Courts Could Interpret the Words “Prescribed by Law” of Article 39
of the Basic Law as Authorizing the Rationality Requirement

The first possible approach is for Hong Kong courts to interpret
Article 39 of the Basic Law as authorizing the rationality requirement.
Deriving the rationality requirement from the Basic Law would serve to
make the requirement applicable to all rights enjoyed by Hong Kong
residents.139 However, courts may be reluctant to interpret the Basic Law
beyond its text. Courts may also be reluctant to develop an interpretation
that could be overturned by the NPCSC.
Article 39 of the Basic Law mandates that the ICCPR be applied to
Hong Kong, providing the constitutional basis for the entire BORO.140
Accordingly, deriving the rationality requirement from language in Article
39 would serve to authorize the requirement for the entire BORO, including
both textually absolute and textually qualified BORO rights. In Ng Ka Ling
& Others v. Director of Immigration, the Court of Final Appeal set out the
basic approach to interpreting the Basic Law.141 The Court asserted that a
“purposive approach” is to be used when interpreting the Basic Law:
The adoption of a purposive approach is necessary because a
constitution states general principles and expresses purposes
without condescending to particularity and definition of terms.
Gaps and ambiguities are bound to arise, and in resolving them,
the courts are bound to give effect to the principles and
138

See supra Part III.B.
See BASIC LAW, supra note 12, art. 39.
140
Id.
141
Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration, [1999] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 577 (C.F.A.); Yash Ghai, The
Intersection of Chinese Law and the Common Law in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region:
Question of Technique or Politics? 37 HONG KONG L. J. 363, 385 (2007).
139
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purposes declared in, and to be ascertained from the
constitutional and relevant extrinsic materials.
So, in
ascertaining the true meaning of the instrument, the court must
consider the purpose of the instrument and its relevant
provisions as well as the language of the text in the light of the
context, context being of particular importance in the
interpretation of a constitutional instrument.142
In this way, the Court of Final Appeal stated that courts should interpret the
Basic Law according to its legislative purpose. When doing so, Hong Kong
courts primarily look to text when determining legislative intent.143
Following these principles of statutory interpretation, courts could
interpret language in Article 39 of the Basic Law to derive the rationality
requirement.144 Article 39 specifically states:
The provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights . . . as applied to Hong Kong shall remain in
force and shall be implemented through the laws of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region.
The rights and freedoms enjoyed by Hong Kong residents shall
not be restricted unless as prescribed by law. Such restrictions
shall not contravene the provisions of the preceding paragraph
of this Article.145
In its text, Article 39 mandates that the ICCPR is to be applied to Hong
Kong, which is achieved by the BORO. The Article also states that rights
can only be restricted by law.
The words “prescribed by law” in Article 39 are a potential source for
interpretation because they already note a basis for restriction of rights—that
they be imposed through law. A court could interpret these words as
requiring that restrictions imposed by the Legislative Council also meet the
rationality requirement. In a sense, this interpretation would serve as a
limitation on the extent that the Legislative Council could restrict a BORO
right by law.
142

Ng Ka Ling, 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 339-40.
Chong Fung Yuen, 2 H.K.L.R.D. at 546 (“The courts' role under the common law in interpreting
the Basic Law is to construe the language used in the text of the instrument in order to ascertain the
legislative intent as expressed in the language. Their task is not to ascertain the intent of the lawmaker on
its own. Their duty is to ascertain what was meant by the language used and to give effect to the legislative
intent as expressed in the language. It is the text of the enactment which is the law and it is regarded as
important both that the law should be certain and that it should be ascertainable by the citizen.”).
144
See Ghai, supra note 141, at 386.
145
BASIC LAW, supra note 12, art. 39.
143
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Interpreting Article 39 in this manner would have two strengths. The
first strength would be that the rationality requirement would not depend on
Leung Kwok Hung’s formulation that the rationality requirement be derived
from the word “necessary” contained in BORO rights. Rather, the
rationality requirement would have a constitutional basis in the Basic Law.
The second strength would be that the rationality requirement would be
mandated for all rights contained in Hong Kong’s legal system. Article 39
covers “[t]he rights and freedoms enjoyed by Hong Kong residents.”146 This
language presumably covers not only textually absolute and textually
qualified BORO rights but also all rights contained in the Basic Law,
domestic legislation, and common law. Thus, interpreting Article 39 as
authorizing the rationality requirement would serve to mandate that all
restrictions imposed by the Legislative Council be rationally connected to
legitimate state aims.
Despite this approach’s strengths, courts are unlikely to interpret the
Basic Law in this manner. Courts are resistant to adopting an interpretation
that is weakly supported by the text.147 Illustrating this point, the Court of
Final Appeal in Director of Immigration v. Chong Fung Yuen stated that
“the courts must avoid a literal, technical, narrow or rigid approach [of the
Basic Law], they cannot give the language a meaning which it cannot
bear.”148 The plain meaning of the words “prescribed by law” may merely
dictate that restrictions be imposed by law.149 The words may simply not
support a broad interpretation authorizing the rationality requirement.
Accordingly, courts may be unwilling to broadly interpret Article 39 as
supporting the rationality requirement.150
Courts may be unwilling to adopt a broad interpretation of Article 39
because their interpretation could be overturned by a contrary NPCSC
interpretation.151 Pursuant to Article 158 of the Basic Law, the NPCSC has
power of interpretation over the Basic Law in all cases.152 Through this
power, the NPCSC can overturn any Hong Kong courts’ interpretation of the
Basic Law. This threat is not merely theoretical.153 In Ng Ka Ling, the
NPCSC rejected a Court of Final Appeal interpretation of the Basic Law by
146

See id.
See Chong Fung Yuen, 2 H.K.L.R.D. at 546.
148
Id.
149
See Leung Kwok Hung, 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 181-82.
150
See also Yang Xiaonan, Legislative Interpretations by the Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress in China, 38 HONG KONG L. J. 255, 268 (2008).
151
See Chen, supra note 39, at 662; Po Jen Yap, Constitutional Review under the Basic Law: The
Rise, Retreat and Resurgence of Judicial Power in Hong Kong, 37 HONG KONG L. J. 449, 473 (2007).
152
See Basic Law, supra note 12, art. 158.
153
See Ng Ka Ling, 1 H.K.L.R.D. 577; NPCSC Interpretation, supra note 53.
147
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issuing a contrary interpretation that trumped the Court’s.154 In order to
avoid a similar situation to Ng Ka Ling, courts may interpret the Basic Law
in a politically sensitive matter that does not provoke a response from the
NPCSC.155 Thus, courts may be reluctant to interpret Article 39 as
authorizing the rationality requirement.
Overall, courts could broadly interpret Article 39 of the BORO as
authorizing the rationality requirement. However, courts may be unwilling
to interpret the Basic Law beyond its text. Furthermore, courts may be
unwilling to risk a contrary NPCSC interpretation.
B.

Courts Should Imply the Rationality Requirement into the BORO

Rather than root the rationality requirement in the Basic Law, Hong
Kong courts should follow a second possible approach: Implying the
rationality requirement into the BORO. Doing so would authorize the
rationality requirement for both textually absolute and textually qualified
rights.156 Furthermore, this approach would lead to little risk of the courts’
interpretations being overturned by the Legislative Council or NPCSC.157
Courts could utilize two potential methods to implying the rationality
requirement into the BORO: 1) courts could liberally construe BORO
articles or 2) courts could interpret Article 2(4) of the BORO as
incorporating the rationality requirement.
1.

Courts Could Liberally Construe BORO Articles

The first method courts could use to imply the rationality
requirement158 is to liberally construe BORO articles. “A statute is liberally
construed when its letter is extended to include matters within the spirit or
purpose of the statute.”159 Following this principle, courts construe the
BORO according to its purpose. The stated purpose is provided in the
preamble of the BORO: “to provide for incorporation into the law of Hong
Kong of provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
154

See Ng Ka Ling, 1 H.K.L.R.D. 577; NPCSC Interpretation, supra note 53.
See Chen, supra note 39, at 662; Yap, supra note 151, at 473.
See infra Part IV.B.i.
157
See infra Part IV.B.ii.
158
In Lam Kwong Wai, the Court of Final Appeal stated that “[i]n Hong Kong, it has been accepted
that a justification provision is to be implied in the BOR[O].” 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 819. The Court used the
justification provision as including the rationality requirement. Unfortunately, the Court did not elucidate
on what grounds the rationality requirement is implied in the BORO. Furthermore, the Court’s ultimate
decision in this case to adopt the rationality requirement was based on Leung Kwok Hung. The basis of the
Court’s statement is uncertain.
159
NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 58.6 (6th ed. 2000).
155
156
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Rights as applied to Hong Kong.”160 Furthermore, a general rule of statutory
construction in Hong Kong is that the legislature intended the legislation to
conform to public international law.161 Applying this rule to the preamble
suggests that the legislature, when enacting the ordinance, intended the
BORO to conform to foreign interpretations of the ICCPR. Accordingly,
courts could consider foreign jurisprudence that implies the rationality
requirement into the ICCPR.
For example, courts could imply the rationality requirement into
Article 22 of the BORO by referring to Canadian jurisprudence that implies
the requirement into the ICCPR. Article 22 of the BORO provides the right
to equality before the law and is verbatim of Article 26 of the ICCPR.162
Neither the ICCPR nor the BORO articles contain qualifying language.163
The Supreme Court of Canada has authorized the rationality requirement
when considering restrictions on the ICCPR right to equality, “accept[ing]
the constitutionality of legislation providing for differential treatment if
reasonable classifications were made, rationally connected with the
legitimate object of the statute.”164 Thus, looking to foreign jurisdictions,
Hong Kong courts could follow Canada’s interpretation of Article 26 of the
ICCPR and thereby imply the rationality requirement Article 22 of the
BORO.
2.

Courts Could Imply the Rationality Requirement into Article 2(4) of
the BORO

The second method courts could use to imply the rationality
requirement is to interpret Article 2(4) of the BORO as including the
rationality requirement. This Article provides: “Nothing in this Ordinance
shall be interpreted as implying for the Government . . . any right to engage
in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the
rights and freedoms recognized in the Bill of Rights . . . .”165 In a sense, all
restrictions on BORO rights imposed by the Legislative Council are “aimed
at the destruction” because the restrictions prevent the full enjoyment of the
BORO right. Article 2(4) seems to prohibit the government from excessive
restriction of BORO rights. Courts could reason that the rationality
160

BORO, supra note 6, at pmbl.
Carole J. Petersen, The Right to Equality in the Public Sector: An Assessment of Post-Colonial
Hong Kong, 32 HONG KONG L. J. 103, 125 (2002) (citing R v Sin Yau Ming, 1 H.K.P.L.R. at 105).
162
Compare BORO, supra note 6, art. 22, with ICCPR, supra note 11, art. 26.
163
Compare BORO, supra note 6, art. 22, with ICCPR, supra note 11, art. 26.
164
JAYAWICKRAMA, supra note 106, at 822 (citing Mckay v. The Queen, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 370 (Can.)).
165
BORO, supra note 6, art. 2(4).
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requirement is implied in Article 2(4) because it reduces the Legislative
Council’s ability to “destroy” BORO rights. Because this provision applies
to all rights contained in the BORO, authorizing the rationality requirement
in this provision would cover both textually absolute and textually qualified
rights.
Both of these approaches would serve to overturn Leung Kwok
Hung’s prescription that the rationality requirement be rooted in the word
“necessary.”
Rather, these approaches would derive the rationality
requirement from foreign interpretations of the ICCPR or the all-rights
encompassing Article 2(4) of the BORO. Therefore, the rationality
requirement would not be reliant on qualifying language in BORO text as
prescribed by Leung Kwok Hung, but rather become a doctrine rooted in
statutory interpretation of the BORO.
3.

Implying the Rationality Requirement into the BORO Runs Little Risk
of Being Overturned by the Legislative Council or NPCSC

Implying the rationality requirement into the BORO is unlikely to be
overturned by the Legislative Council or NPCSC. If the courts were to
imply the rationality requirement into the BORO, the Legislative Council
could attempt to negate the courts by amending or supplementing the BORO
in a manner that expressly eliminates the courts’ interpretations of the
BORO. This situation, however, would be unlikely for three reasons. First,
the Council has rarely modified the BORO.166 Since 1991, only several
small modifications have been made.167 Second, Hong Kong is heavily
reliant on its image as an international finance center.168 The Council is
unlikely to risk damage to this image by degrading Hong Kong’s compliance
with international human rights standards.169 Because the BORO applies the
ICCPR to Hong Kong, any major modification to the BORO would lead to
international scrutiny by human rights groups and monitoring by the United
Nations Human Rights Committee.170 Third, the Council is unlikely to risk
provoking strong opposition and protest from Hong Kong’s politically
motivated residents. They are unlikely to repeat the situation in 2003, when
“vehement protests, culminating in a half-million strong protest march,
166

See Young, supra note 13, at 110.
Id.
168
See Sir Anthony Mason, The Place of Comparative Law in Developing the Jurisprudence on the
Rule of Law and Human Rights in Hong Kong, 37 HONG KONG L. J. 299, 302 (2007).
169
Id.
170
See CARLSON & GRISVOLD, supra note 66, at 4-13. Amnesty International monitors human rights
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forced the government to drop the [introduction of national security
legislation].”171 Fourth, the Council is unlikely to risk invalidation of
modifications to the BORO. If modifications were enacted, courts would be
able to engage in constitutional review of the modifications, reviewing
whether they are contrary to Article 39’s mandate of applying the ICCPR to
Hong Kong.172
Implying the rationality requirement into the BORO would also
remain outside NPCSC jurisdiction. Under Article 158 of the Basic Law,
the NPCSC jurisdiction limited to interpretation of the Basic Law, not
domestic legislation. Courts’ interpretation of domestic legislation, such as
the BORO, cannot be overturned by the NPCSC. Accordingly, if the
rationality requirement is rooted in BORO interpretation, the NPCSC cannot
issue a contrary interpretation of the BORO.
Overall, courts should imply the rationality requirement into the
BORO because doing so would authorize the requirement for textually
absolute and textually qualified rights. Furthermore, there would be little
risk of the courts’ being overturned by the Legislative Council or NPCSC.
V.

CONCLUSION

Hong Kong Courts have misapplied Leung Kwok Hung’s formulation
by applying the rationality requirement when considering restrictions on
textually absolute BORO rights. This is contrary to the Court of Final
Appeal’s formulation set out in Leung Kwok Hung in which the rationality
requirement is derived from the word “necessary” in qualifying language in
the BORO article. In order to correct this misapplication, courts should
consider two potential approaches to authorizing the rationality requirement
for BORO rights. First, courts could interpret Article 39 of the Basic Law
“purposively” and interpret words in its text to require the rationality
requirement. Second, courts could imply the rationality requirement into the
BORO. While both of these two approaches would eliminate the rationality
requirement’s reliance on the word “necessary” in the BORO as formulated
by Leung Kwok Hung, courts should adopt second approach because it bears
little risk of being overturned by the Legislative Council or Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress.
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